Club提要：美以对伊战争升级，将中国推入“被期待却难深度介入”的复杂处境。北京对话特约专家王晋在The Diplomat（ 《外交学人》）杂志发文指出，北京一方面坚决反对美以侵犯他国主权；另一方面对伊朗升级局势、霍尔木兹海峡通航受到威胁持审慎态度。在中美峰会、中阿峰会临近、能源安全承压的背景下，中国正积极进行外交斡旋、同时保持战略克制，在多重利益之间寻求平衡与回旋空间，强调维护地区稳定与自身战略经济利益。

（翻译｜蒋飒茹 核译｜金地、韩桦）

当下（美以伊）冲突的演进，使北京在战略上陷入一种复杂而微妙的处境。

随着冲突爆发，中国的地位和作用迅速成为国际舆论关注的焦点之一。在部分媒体分析报道中，中国被描绘为伊朗的重要伙伴，与俄罗斯一道，同德黑兰保持着紧密的政治和外交联系。一些观点甚至认为，中国在金融合作、政治参与及科技交流层面对伊朗具有重大影响力。因此，中国有时被外界视为在当前危机中可能影响伊朗政策选择的关键国家之一。

因此，中东紧张局势的突然升级，让地区国家和国际社会对中国可能发挥的作用抱有极大期望。

近年来，中国在中东事务中持续推动对话与和解，典型案例包括促成伊朗与沙特阿拉伯恢复外交关系、支持巴勒斯坦各派在北京和解谈判，并最终签署《北京宣言》，这些外交实践对该地区产生了积极影响。在此背景下，许多观察人士密切关注中国在当前伊朗冲突中的立场和行动，期待中国继续在缓解紧张局势、推动政治解决方面发挥建设性作用。

中国在美以伊战争中有重要地位（图源：外交学人）

然而，中国并未如一些外部观察者所预期，在本轮美以对伊朗战争中发挥显性或直接的介入。尽管中国第一时间就表明反对美国和以色列对伊朗发动军事打击，强调此类行动可能破坏地区稳定，并呼吁各方保持克制，但并未向伊朗提供直接军事支持。与此同时，中方也对伊朗封锁霍尔木兹海峡、打击邻近海湾阿拉伯国家目标等可能引发局势升级的举措表示关切。

在具体行动上，中国既没有向中东地区部署军力，也没有向冲突任何一方提供新的武器援助，而是以外交接触为主要抓手推进介入。

值得注意的是，冲突爆发恰逢中国召开全国人大和政协会议期间。“两会”是中国每年最重要的政治议程之一，在此期间，高层决策者和大量政府官员必须参与立法和协商程序。因此，中国外交政策领导层的日程安排已经受到严格限制。

尽管如此，中国还是迅速启动了外交沟通渠道。两会期间，王毅外长多次与有关国家外长通电话，表达中方对地区局势升级的担忧，敦促各方保持克制，寻求外交解决方案。同时，中国派遣中东问题特使翟隽访问沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋等地区国家，与有关各方开展对话协调，推动停火努力，力图防止冲突外溢。

即使国内正在进行重大政治活动，中国仍利用多种外交渠道采取积极措施，缓解紧张局势，展示其在地区事务中建设性和负责任的作用。这一政策方针引发了广泛的关于中国在当前冲突中的作用和战略考量，而有关人士则继续关注中国如何评估不断变化的局势以及未来可能采取什么外交措施。

当前冲突的发展使中国在战略上处于复杂且略显两难的地位。一方面，中国明确反对美国和以色列对伊朗采取的军事行动。从北京的角度来看，军事行动代表了华盛顿近年来奉行的单边政策的延续。特别是自2026年初以来，美国在多个地区问题上采取了坚决的行动，被一些观察者视为加强其全球战略影响力的进一步举动。

例如，美国在委内瑞拉问题上采取强硬立场，并在与丹麦的讨论中就格陵兰岛提出了新的主权主张。在此背景下，美国深度介入伊朗局势及其对伊朗的直接军事攻击被中国视为是可能挑战现有国际准则和秩序的行动。因此，中国认为这些军事行动侵犯了伊朗的领土主权，可能破坏地区稳定和国际法原则，应通过政治和外交手段予以解决。

同时，伊朗随后的报复行动也客观上影响了中国的利益。冲突爆发后，伊朗不仅对以色列目标发动袭击，还袭击了几个邻近阿拉伯国家，进一步加剧了整个地区的紧张局势。更重要的是，伊朗开始封锁霍尔木兹海峡，直接影响了全球能源运输路线的安全。

2026年3月1日，伊朗民众在德黑兰革命广场聚集举行示威活动，高呼反美和反以色列口号（图源：视觉中国）

对于中国来说，霍尔木兹海峡具有突出的战略意义。一旦这一关键通道受阻，中国自海湾地区进口能源的安全将面临直接冲击。长期以来，中国推动能源多元化进口战略，沙特阿拉伯、巴林、伊拉克等多个海湾阿拉伯国家是中国石油供应的重要来源。然而，随着霍尔木兹海峡通航不确定性上升，中国从这些国家进口的石油和天然气的运输路线就会面临越来越大的风险，进而对中国的能源安全构成新的挑战。

在此背景下，中国在反对美国和以色列军事行动的同时，也对伊朗某些可能加剧地区风险的报复措施保持审慎态度。尤其是针对邻近阿拉伯国家的袭击，以及对关键能源运输通道稳定性的威胁，均引发中方高度关切。总体而言，中国更倾向于推动冲突缓和，通过加强外交沟通和政治谈判来缓解紧张局势，防止局势进一步升级，并尽量减少对全球能源市场和国际经济稳定的负面影响。

在评估当前形势时，中国还必须考虑几个重要的外交进程，其中之一是美国特朗普总统即将访问中国。近年来，中美经贸摩擦持续，在关税、进出口配额、技术合作以及更广泛的战略利益等方面仍存在重大分歧。尽管双方经过多轮谈判达成暂时缓和，但整体竞争格局并未发生根本性变化。因此，特朗普的访问在中国被视为具有政治和外交意义的事件。北京希望两国领导人会晤有助于管控分歧，降低对抗风险，为稳定双边关系创造条件。

在此背景下，中国在应对中东事态发展时采取了相对谨慎和克制的态度。2026年初以来，尽管美国在委内瑞拉和伊朗采取了一系列强硬行动，但中国对华盛顿的公开批评仍然相对谨慎。与2025年美国和以色列袭击伊朗期间的言论相比，中国目前的公开表态更加克制和低调。这一做法体现了中国希望避免地区冲突产生溢出效应，对中美关系产生负面影响。

中国不希望看到当前的中东紧张局势干扰中美领导人峰会，也不希望看到双边经济关系出现新的不确定性。因此，中方呼吁各方保持理性和克制，通过外交手段逐步缓和局势。

中国必须考虑的另一个重要外交进程是将于2026年举行的中国-阿拉伯国家峰会（以下简称中阿峰会）。这将是自2022年12月会晤后中国与阿拉伯国家的第二次峰会，是中国主办的重要主场多边外交盛会。中国希望通过此次峰会，进一步深化与阿拉伯国家，特别是海湾阿拉伯国家在经济发展、能源合作、新兴技术等领域的合作。

第一届中阿峰会在沙特首都利雅得举办（图源：央视新闻）

目前，中阿双方在人工智能、航空航天、绿色科技、基础设施发展和金融投资等领域具有广泛的合作空间。中国还希望利用海湾国家庞大的市场、丰富的资本和雄心勃勃的发展计划来推进双边和多边合作。

与此同时，中国近年来观察到阿拉伯世界的内部动态发生了显著变化。与2022年左右相对稳定的合作气氛相比，地区国家之间出现了一些新的紧张态势。例如，沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋在某些地区问题上的分歧变得更加明显，各个阿拉伯国家在战略观点上也日渐不同。在此背景下，伊朗对某些邻近阿拉伯国家的军事行动以及霍尔木兹海峡周围的紧张局势可能对地区安全环境产生更广泛的连锁反应。因此，中国担心冲突持续升级可能会对阿拉伯国家如何看待地区局势和外部行为者产生影响。

中方高度重视与伊朗的双边关系，明确反对美国和以色列采取的单方面军事行动，同时对伊朗面临的压力表示一定程度的理解。即便如此，考虑到更广泛的战略和经济利益，北京也不希望看到冲突进一步升级。特别是随着霍尔木兹海峡周边紧张局势和全球能源市场波动的加剧，中国能源安全面临潜在风险。同时，即将举行的中美峰会和中阿峰会也是重要的外交优先事项。因此，中国倾向于维持相对稳定的地区环境，避免对外交和经济利益产生负面影响。

在多种因素交织作用下，中国在当前冲突中的政策空间相对有限，整体处于一种复杂而微妙的战略位置。一方面，中国反对美国和以色列的军事行动，对伊朗局势表示理解。另一方面，中国不支持伊朗可能进一步扩大冲突范围的报复行动，特别是影响地区安全和主要能源运输路线稳定的行动。

在此背景下，中国更倾向于以有限、审慎的方式展开外交斡旋，通过沟通协调与政治对话推动局势缓和，而不是采取更直接或对抗性的方式进行干预。这种“克制中的平衡”，反映了中国在应对高度复杂的地区危机时具有更综合广泛的战略考量。

以下为英文原文：

The development of the current conflict has placed Beijing in a complex and awkward strategic position.

After the outbreak of the conflict among the United States, Israel, and Iran, China’s position and role quickly became a focal point of international attention. In some media and analytical narratives, China has been portrayed as an important partner of Iran, maintaining close political and diplomatic ties with Tehran alongside Russia. Some commentaries even suggest that China has significant influence over Iran through financial cooperation, political engagement, and technological exchanges. As a result, China is sometimes viewed externally as one of the key countries that could potentially shape Iran’s policy choices in the current crisis.

The sudden escalation of tensions in the Middle East has thus generated considerable expectations among regional states and the broader international community regarding China’s possible role. In recent years, China has actively promoted dialogue and reconciliation in Middle Eastern affairs. Notable examples include facilitating the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and supporting reconciliation talks among Palestinian political factions in Beijing, which led to the signing of the Beijing Declaration. These diplomatic initiatives have produced a positive impact in the region. Against this backdrop, many observers are closely watching China’s position and actions in the current conflict involving Iran, expecting China to continue playing a constructive role in easing tensions and promoting political solutions.

However, China has not taken a highly visible or direct role in the current round of confrontation among the United States, Israel, and Iran, as some external observers had anticipated. Although China expressed opposition at an early stage to the military strikes carried out by the United States and Israel against Iran, emphasizing that such actions could undermine regional stability and calling on all parties to exercise restraint, China has not provided direct military support to Iran. At the same time, China has also expressed concern about the potential risks of escalation associated with Iran’s actions, including the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on targets in neighboring Gulf Arab states.

In terms of concrete actions, China has not deployed military forces to the Middle East nor provided new weapons assistance to any party involved in the conflict. Instead, it has primarily engaged through diplomatic channels.

The Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict erupted during the period when China was holding its annual sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The “Two Sessions” constitute one of the most important political events in China each year, during which senior decision-makers and a large number of government officials are required to participate in legislative and consultative proceedings. Under such circumstances, the schedules of China’s foreign policy leadership were already highly constrained.

Despite this, China quickly activated diplomatic communication channels. During the meetings, Foreign Minister Wang Yi conducted multiple phone calls with his counterparts from relevant countries, expressing China’s concerns about the escalation of the regional situation and urging all parties to exercise restraint and pursue diplomatic solutions. At the same time, China dispatched its Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs Zhai Jun to visit countries in the region, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and engage in dialogue and coordination with relevant parties, promoting ceasefire efforts and attempting to prevent further escalation of the conflict. 

Even amid significant domestic political commitments, China utilized multiple diplomatic channels to take proactive steps aimed at easing tensions and demonstrating its constructive and responsible role in regional affairs. This policy approach has prompted extensive discussion about China’s role and strategic calculations in the current conflict, while observers continue to watch how China assesses the evolving situation and what diplomatic steps it may take in the future.

The development of the current conflict has placed China in a complex – and somewhat awkward – strategic position. On the one hand, China clearly opposes the military actions taken by the United States and Israel against Iran. From Beijing’s perspective, these strikes represent a continuation of unilateral policies pursued by Washington in recent years. In particular, since the beginning of 2026, the United States has taken assertive actions in relation to several regional issues, which some observers view as part of a broader effort to reinforce its global strategic influence. 

For instance, the United States adopted a hardline stance on the Venezuela issue and raised new sovereignty claims concerning Greenland in discussions with Denmark. In this context, the United States’deep involvement in the Iranian situation and its direct military attacks on Iran are viewed by China as actions that may challenge existing international norms and order. Consequently, China regards these military actions as infringements upon Iran’s territorial sovereignty and as developments that may undermine regional stability and the principles of international law, which should instead be addressed through political and diplomatic means.

At the same time, Iran’s subsequent retaliatory actions have also objectively affected China’s interests. Following the outbreak of the conflict, Iran not only launched strikes against Israeli targets but also attacked targets in several neighboring Arab states, further heightening tensions across the region. More importantly, Iran began implementing a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, directly affecting the security of global energy transportation routes.

For China, the Strait of Hormuz holds significant strategic importance. Once the passage is disrupted, the security of China’s energy imports from the Gulf region may be affected. For many years, China has pursued a diversified energy import strategy, and several Gulf Arab states – including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iraq – are important sources of China’s oil supply. With shipping through the Strait of Hormuz becoming increasingly uncertain, the transport routes for China’s oil and natural gas imports from these countries face growing risks, posing new challenges to China’s energy security.

Under these circumstances, while opposing the military actions of the United States and Israel, China has also adopted a cautious attitude toward certain Iranian retaliatory measures that may heighten regional risks. In particular, China has expressed concern over attacks against neighboring Arab states and actions that threaten the stability of key energy transport routes. Overall, China is more inclined to promote de-escalation of the conflict, encouraging diplomatic communication and political negotiations to ease tensions, prevent further escalation, and minimize negative impacts on global energy markets and the stability of the international economy.

When assessing the current situation, China must also take into account several important diplomatic agendas. One of these is the upcoming visit of U.S. President Donald Trump to China. In recent years, economic and trade frictions between China and the United States have persisted, with significant differences remaining over tariffs, import and export quotas, technological cooperation, and broader strategic interests. Although the two sides reached a temporary easing arrangement after multiple rounds of negotiations, the overall competitive dynamic has not fundamentally changed. Therefore, Trump’s visit is regarded in China as a politically and diplomatically significant event. Beijing hopes that the meeting between the two leaders can help manage differences, reduce the risk of confrontation, and create conditions for stabilizing bilateral relations.

In this context, China has adopted a relatively cautious and restrained tone in addressing developments in the Middle East. Since the beginning of 2026, despite a series of assertive actions taken by the United States in Venezuela and Iran, China’s public criticism of Washington has remained relatively measured. Compared with the rhetoric used during the U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran in 2025, China’s current public messaging has been notably more restrained and low-key. This approach reflects China’s desire to avoid spillover effects from regional conflicts that could negatively affect China–U.S. relations.

China does not wish to see the current Middle Eastern tensions interfere with the upcoming summit between Chinese and U.S. leaders or introduce new uncertainties into bilateral economic relations. Accordingly, China prefers to call on all parties to exercise rationality and restraint and to gradually de-escalate the situation through diplomatic means.

Another important diplomatic agenda that China must consider is the China–Arab States Summit scheduled for June 2026. This will be the second summit between China and Arab states following the meeting held in December 2022, and it represents an important multilateral diplomatic event hosted by China. Through this summit, China hopes to further deepen cooperation with Arab countries – especially the Gulf Arab states – in areas such as economic development, energy cooperation, and emerging technologies. 

At present, both sides see broad opportunities for collaboration in fields including artificial intelligence, aerospace, green technology, infrastructure development, and financial investment. China also hopes to leverage the large markets, abundant capital, and ambitious development plans of Gulf countries to advance both bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

At the same time, China has observed notable changes within the internal dynamics of the Arab world in recent years. Compared with the relatively stable cooperative atmosphere around 2022, some new sources of tension have emerged among regional states. For example, differences between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over certain regional issues have become more apparent, and varying strategic perspectives have increasingly appeared among Arab states. In this context, Iran’s military actions against certain neighboring Arab states and the tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz could generate broader ripple effects on the regional security environment. China is therefore concerned that continued escalation of the conflict could influence how Arab states perceive the regional situation and the role of external actors.

China places great importance on its bilateral relationship with Iran and has clearly opposed the unilateral military actions taken by the United States and Israel, while expressing a degree of understanding regarding the pressures facing Iran. Even so, Beijing does not wish to see the conflict escalate further when considering its broader strategic and economic interests. In particular, with tensions rising around the Strait of Hormuz and volatility increasing in global energy markets, China’s energy security faces potential risks. At the same time, the upcoming China–U.S. summit and the China–Arab States Summit represent important diplomatic priorities. China therefore prefers to maintain a relatively stable regional environment to avoid negative impacts on its diplomatic and economic interests.

Under the combined influence of these multiple factors, China’s policy space in the current conflict is relatively limited, placing it in a complex strategic position. On the one hand, China opposes the military actions of the United States and Israel and expresses understanding for Iran’s situation. On the other hand, China does not support retaliatory actions by Iran that could further expand the scope of the conflict, particularly those affecting regional security and the stability of key energy transport routes.

In this context, China is more inclined to pursue limited and cautious mediation through diplomatic means, promoting de-escalation through communication, persuasion, and political dialogue rather than intervening in a more direct or confrontational manner. This relatively restrained and balanced policy approach reflects China’s broader strategic calculations in navigating a highly complex regional crisis.

（本文首发于The Diplomat，作者为CGTN评论员、北京对话特约专家王晋，原文链接：https://thediplomat.com/2026/03/chinas-difficult-choice-in-the-iran-israel-us-war/）